Corporations -- Sales of Assets -- Presumption of Fair Value Favoring Demands of Dissenters by Turner, Dailey R.
308 LAW JOURNAL - JUNE, 1940
court puts all sleight-of-hand performers to shame in deducing in the
Gri fith case that "By the same token, when it loaned its financial credit,
it made itself indebted to the seller."'48 The public is not allowed to
learn the magic by which a municipality purchasing on time payments is
first transformed into a creditor only to then be reclassed a debtor. Yet
on the strength of this deduction, the court concluded "that if the bonds
in this case are issued as contemplated, the state not only lends its credit
by the contribution of its property in esse but becomes indirectly indebted
on account of these bonds."49 Here would seem to lie the weakest link
in the chain of reasoning by which Ohio's high court invalidated the first
effort made under the Building Authority Act. But that court's opinion
and decision in the Griffith litigation gives evidence that on this very
matter will come the greatest judicial resistance to further efforts to
find a solution through the general technique contemplated in that
legislation. J.M.H.
CORPORATIONS
CORPORATIONS - SALES OF ASSETS - PRESUMPTION OF FAIR
VALUE FAVORING DEMANDS OF DISSENTERS
The early American corporation was a small enterprise with a
simple financial structure and few stockholders, most of whom were
actively engaged in the management of the business. In most jurisdic-
tions, a majority of the stockholders of a solvent corporation were
denied the power to transfer all of its property,' effect a consolidation
or merger,2 or bring about fundamental changes in the financial struc-
ture,3 as against the dissent of a single stockholder.
These common law rules were inadequate to meet the changing
needs of the modern corporate system. It became apparent that majority
shareholders were too greatly restricted if sweeping changes in corporate
structure were to be carried out with efficiency and dispatch; greater
" Supra, note -8, at 617, 2z N.E. (zd) at zo6.
9 ib id.
'Butler v. New Keystone Copper Co., Io Del. Ch. 371 (19 1); Abbott v. American
Hard Rubber Co., 33 Barb. Ch. 578 (N.Y. 1861); Kean v. Johnson, 9 N.J. Eq. 401
(1853), (often cited as a leading case denying to the majority the right to sell. The
decision was perhaps influenced by the fact that the corporation involved was a railroad,
and a quasi-public corporation); 3 CooF, CORPORATIONS (8th ed. 1923) sec. 670; 13
FL.TCnER, CYC. CORP. (PERM. En.) sec. 5797. Contra: Treadwell v. Salisbury Mfg.
Co., 73 Mass. 393, 66 Am. Dec. 490 (S856); see Warren, Transfers of Corporate Under-
takings (1917) 30 HARv. L. R-v. 335..
2 Garrett v. Reid-Cashion Land & Cattle Co., 34- Ariz. 245, 270 Pac. bo44, rehearing
denied, 34 Ariz. 482, 272 Pac. 918 (x928); Colgate v. U. S. Leather Co., 75 N.J. Eq.
2Z9, 72 Atl. xz6, i9 Ann. Cases 1262 (gog).
'Kent v. The Quicksilver Mining Co., 78 N.Y. 159 (1879).
flexibility in corporate management was demanded. Furthermore, it
was recognized that the minority should not be able to compel the con-
tinuation of the business of the corporation against the wishes of the
majority.
In Ohio, the legislature has met this need and the majority has
been given the power to sell4 all of the corporation's assets and to make
other fundamental changes.' In the event of such a sale, the dissenting
stockholders have been given the right to receive the fair cash value of
their shares, provided that they comply with the provisions set forth in
Ohio G.C. sec. 8623-72, commonly called the appraisal statute.
In the case of Voeller et al. v. The Neilston Warehouse Co. et al.'
the unnumbered seventh paragraph,' of the Ohio appraisal statute was
declared unconstitutional. At a stockholders meeting called for the
purpose, and done in conformity to Ohio G.C. sec. 8623-65, the re-
quisite majority of the stockholders of the defendant corporation voted
to approve a sale by the directors of a piece of real estate owned by the
corporation and comprising substantially the only remaining asset of the
corporation. The plaintiffs are minority stockholders who voted against
the sale. Acting in compliance with Ohio G.C. sec. 8632-72 they
demanded of the corporation the payment of the fair cash value of their
shares, some shareholders placing such value at $ioo per share, the par
value of which was $Ioo.
The defendant corporation failed to act in compliance with para-
graph five Ohio G.C. sec. 8623-72. Instead, within ten days, the
corporation, by its president, sent a letter to each of the claimants
advising them that their damands for payment were unequivocally
refused. About a month and a half later, the directors took official
action toward dissolving the corporation, designated a local bank as
liquidating agent, and turned over to it the cash and other assets.
No suit having been begun by either the corporation or the minority
stockholders to have the fair cash value of the shares of such minority
determined within a six-month period, as provided by the sixth para-
graph of Ohio G.C. sec. 8623-72, the plaintiffs sued the corporation
and the bank, asking for judgment in an amount equal to the sum
'Onio G.C. sec. 862 3-65.
'Omio G.C. sees. S6z3-14, xs, i5a, 67.
'136 Ohio St. 427, z6 N.E. (zd) 44z decided March 27, 1940.
"If such petition (referring to the petition, which may be made within six months
after the vote was taken, to the court of common pleas to determine the fair cash value of
the shares of the dissenters) is not filed within such period, the fair cash value of the
.shares shall conclusively be deemed to be equal to the amount offered to the dissenting
shareholder by the corporation if any such offer shall have been made by it as above pro-
vided, or in the absence thereof, then an amount equal to that demanded by the dissenting
shareholder as above provided."
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originally demanded s as the fair cash value. The corporation challenged
the constitutionality of Ohio G.C. sec. 8623-72, paragraph seven, as it
was sought to be invoked, on the ground that it deprived the majority
stockholders of their property without due process of law.9 The trial
court declared paragraph seven, Ohio G.C. sec. 8623-72, to be uncon-
stitutional. This judgment was reversed by the Court of Appeals, one
judge dissenting, and the Ohio Supreme Court, two judges dissenting,"°
reversed the Court of Appeals and affirmed the judgment of the trial
court.
The Supreme Court, in its majority opinion, takes the position that
the consenting shareholders had no notice of the demands of the
dissenters and even if they had had notice, they had no opportunity to be
heard, and consequently there was a denial of due process of law.
As to the definition of due process of law there is no dispute in this
case. "Due process of law involves only the essential rights of notice
and hearing, or opportunity to be heard before a competent tribunal."'
Furthermore, both the trial court and the Supreme Court take the
position that by the operation of the statute there results no denial of due
process to the corporation but that there is a denial of due process only as
to the majority shareholders, as individuals.
It is true that the statute nowhere requires notice of the demands
of dissenters to be given to the consenting shareholders. But is notice
to them necessary? The privilege of incorporation is a privilege granted
by the state acting through the legislature,'" and the laws of the state,
constitutional or statutory, enter into and become a part of the articles of
incorporation. 3 Of these laws the stockholder is charged with notice
when he becomes a stockholder, and under the reserved power of the
state"'4 he is bound by the pertinent statutes passed after he becomes a
stockholder. Since corporations are allowed to function only with the
consent of the state and in accordance with the requirements imposed
by the state, may it not be said that all stockholders have consented in
advance, in matters of appraisal, to the procedure set up in the statute
for this purpose-that the stockholders have really appointed the cor-
poration to act for them as in other ordinary business matters? If the
SOHIO G.C. sec. 8623-72, paragraph 7.
Upon a distribution of the assets of the corporation after dissolution, the majority
shareholders will receive a less amount per share, if the plaintiffs are paid the $soo per
share which they have demanded, than if the plaintiffs are required to share pro rata with
the majority in the assets distributed.
10 One of the dissenting judges concurred in the syllabus but dissented from the
judgment.
"Luff. v. State, 1i7 Ohio St. 102, 113, 157 N.E. 388 (19z7).
'Ashley v. Ryan, 49 Ohio St. 504, 527, 31 N.E. 721 (892).
1Wegener v. Wegener, ios Ohio St. 2z, x26 N.E. 89z (192o).
1 011o CONSTITuToN, ART. IIIsec. 2.
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assets of a corporation are impaired as a result of unwise management
in the day to day business affairs of the corporation, would anyone be
heard to assert that such loss was without due process of law to the
majority shareholders?
There are practical difficulties arising out of the Supreme Court's
interpretation. What if the corporation had informed the dissenters,
in the instant case, that it would pay the amount demanded? Would
the court have held that such agreement would not be binding upon
the corporation and the majority stockholders, and that the latter
could prevent the payment of that amount because they, as individual
shareholders, had been given no actual notice of the demand and agree-
ment. Surely, notice to the consenting stockholders would be no more
necessary in the case where the corporation refuses to pay the amount
demanded than where it agrees to pay it.
Or suppose that the corporation, refusing to pay the amount
demanded, had, itself, made an offer of "an amount," as it had a right
to do. The statute' would create a conclusive presumption in favor
of the amount offered by the corporation, if neither the corporation nor
the dissenters petitioned the court within six months to have the fair
cash value determined. Under such facts would the court say that due
process required the dissenters to notify the consenting shareholders of
the amount offered by the corporation? Consistency would seem to
require notice in one case as much as in the other.
It was the contention of defendants that while the board of directors
represent the shareholders in corporate matters they are not representa-
twes of the shareholders as respects the latters' individual rights-that
in this case the defendant is a corporation in dissolution with nothing
remaining to be done but distribute the assets to the shareholders, hence
they, and only they, as individuals, are interested in the method of
distribution. On the contrary, at the stockholders meeting called for
the purpose of voting on the proposed sale, it does not appear that any
nction was taken on the matter of distribution of the assets, and it was
not until about a month and a half after the date of this meeting that
the directors authorized dissolution of the corporation.
The dissent of minority stockholders gives rise under the statute:"
to a controversy only between the corporation and the dissenting stock-
holders, and hence, the controversy in this case is not between two
classes of stockholders nor between two groups of stockholders of the
same class. The provision of sections 8623-65 and 8623-72 prescribe
and control the rights and remedies of both the corporation and those
'5OHzo G.C. 86z 3 -7z, paragraph seven, set out in note 7, supra.
"'OHio G.C. 86z3-72.
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who oppose action of the kind under consideration, and file written
demands for payment of the fair cash value of their shares. Thus the
question involved is one between the corporation and those who became
claimants by filing written demands.
The Supreme Court points out that the controlling statute does
not expressly provide for action on the part of the majority and the
court declares that no real detriment occurred to the majority until the
expiration of the six-month period when the conclusive presumption
became absolute and thus concludes that the majority had no cause of
action until after the six-month period, when it would be too late. A
shareholder may be given opportunity to be heard without showing a
presently existing injury if he can show threatened irreparable injury."l
Any individual majority shareholder, upon demand of and refusal by
the corporation to bring such suit, had a right at any time during the
six-month period to bring a representative suit to determine the fair cash
value of the shares."8
While parties are entitled to have their day in court they are
not to be compelled to come into court and it is only necessary that
they have a "fair opportunity" to avail themselves of judicial process.
Moreover, this same majority had another "fair opportunity." It had
the right under the controlling statute' to revoke the authority given to
the board of directors to sell the property in question.
Furthermore, the dissenters take the position that even if the court
should find that paragraph seven does have an unconstitutional operation
as respects the majority stockholders, it should find also that the
majority are estopped to question the constitutionality of that part of the
statute because of the principle of law that a party who invokes the
provision of a statute for his own purpose, and obtains relief under that
statute to the disadvantage of another party, will not thereafter be heard
to complain of the validity of the statute which he has invoked."9 The
Ohio Supreme Court has already adopted this principle in New York
'Dodge v. Woolsey, 18 How. 331, IS L. Ed. 401 (iS56). This is a leading case
which arose in Ohio. The directors of an Ohio bank, the charter of which stipulated the
amount of tax it should pay in lieu of all taxes, refused to question the validity of a
statute increasing the rate of taxation. The directors of the bank believed that the new
tax was unconstitutional but objected to resisting the tax by litigation. The tax collector
had collected the tax for one year and was preparing to collect it for another year when
Dodge, a stockholder, sought an injunction permanently restraining the collection of the
tax. The Supreme Court sustained the stockholder's bill, which alleged that the tax was
so onerous on the bank that it would finally compel a suspension of its business.
'Dodge v. Woolsey, 18 How. 331, I5 L. Ed. 4o (s856); Zinn v. Baxter, 6S Ohio
Sa. 341, 6z N.E. 327 (sgo9) 13 FLETCHER, CYc. CORP. (PERNI. ED.) SeC. S939 at Seq;
sO OHIO JURISPRUDENCE sec. 244 et seq.
" OHIO G.C. 8623-72, paragraph xg.
'Pierce Oil Co. v. Phoenix Refining Co., z59 U.S. izS, 66 L. Ed. 85S (19zz)-
Hirsh v. Block, z67 Fed. 614 (19zo).
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Central R. R. Company v. City of Bucyrus.2 Applying the rule of
that decision to the instant case should we say that the corporation and
the majority stockholders, having invoked the provisions of Ohio G.C.
sec. 8623-65, will not be permitted to claim the unconstitutionality of
any part of Ohio G.C. sec. 8623-72, because the latter section is made
a part of the former one? The court answers this by saying that the
one section is not made a part of the other, that they are separate and
distinct and cover different subjects, Ohio G.C. sec. 8623-65 author-
izing the corporation to sell its assets upon a favorable vote of the stock-
holders, and Ohio G.C. sec 8623-72 dealing with the rights of dis-
senting stockholders after the vote.
This view of the court seems to ignore the intent of the legislature
as e-idenced by the language of the statute, and the obvious purpose of
protecting minority stockholders. The last paragraph of Ohio. G.C.
sec. 8623-65 states, "Dissenting shareholders, whether or not entitled
to vote, shall be entitled to relief in the manner and under the conditions
hereinafter provided." A sale of substantially all of the assets of an
Ohio corporation may be had only by compliance with this section, and
when they authorized the sale the majority impliedly agreed to provide
for dissenters. To what relief are the dissenters entitled? Why, to that
"hereinafter provided," and the only relief hereinafter provided is that
provided in Ohio G.C. sec. 8623-72, which is entitled, "Dissenting
Shareholders." J.M.B.
CORPORATIONS - VESTED RIGHTS IN ACCRUED CUMULATIVE
DIVIDENDS- POWER OF CANCELLATION UNDER
NEW AMENDMENT TO STATUTES
By the articles of incorporation of the defendant corporation, organ-
ized in 1923, certain shares of preferred stock were issued with 7%
cumlative dividends. In 1935, the articles were amended to provide for
an exchange of the first issue carrying 7%o, for the new issue of 5 ,
with a 22 % dividend on the new stock payable immediately, and also
for the issue of one share of new common, admittedly worth about
$6.oo, in cancellation of all accrued and unpaid dividends on the old
preferred, which amounted to $24.50. The plaintiff, a holder of the
original preferred, refused to exchange his old stock for the new issue
and sued to enjoin the payment of dividends on the common stock
until the unpaid cumulated but undeclared dividends, which had ac-
iz6 Ohio St. 558, 1S6 N.E. 450 (1933). In this case the court, having declared
the Etatute involved to be unconstitutional, nevertheless declared that a party claiming
contitutional invalidity while having received and still holding the fruits of an agreement
made under the statute is estopped from questioning its unconstitutionality.
